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THE FUNDAMENTAL  ERROR  OF <'ICAPITAL 
UND  ICAPITALZINS." 
THE very learned and interesting treatiae of  Professor 
Böhm-Bawerk has called forth a great deal of  able adverse 
criticism,  sufficient, as it  appears  to me, to disoredit the 
results he attains.  The book  has, liowever, attracted so 
much notice, and such favorable comment in other quar- 
ters, as to maite it evident that more  remaius to be said 
before the  rebuttal  of  his  theory  mill be  generally  ac- 
cepted as conclusive.  Among  the adverse  comments the 
book  has caUed forth, so  far, at least, as they have fallen 
under  my observation, there has been but little attempt 
to  trace the  assumed  errora to the misconception which 
must  underlie  them  if  they  are  errors.  If  it  can  be 
unequivocally  demonstrated, as I thinlc  it  can be,  that 
Professor  Böhm-Bawerlc has misconceived the  nature  of 
the problem  he has set himself, that he is reaUy unawnre 
of  what  interest  actually  is,  a  point  of  view  will  be 
gained from which the dispute between him aud his critics 
can be authoritatively determined, und  from which, per- 
haps,  some  light  may  inoidentally be  thrown  upon the 
problem  of  interest itself. 
This misconception appears very early in his work.  It 
is to be found in what  he  has to say about the  industrial 
function of  the undertalcer und the nature of  his reward. 
Of  what is there  said  it is only necessary at present to 
quote the concluding parayraphs : - 
"The question whether the so-culied undertaker's profit 
is  a  profit  on  capital  or  not  I  purposely leave  Open. 
Happily, Ican do so  without prejzcdz'ce to our investigation; 
for, at the worst, it is just  those phenomena mhich we all 
reC0g~iZe  as interest  that constitute  the  great majority 
und  contain  the  characteristio substance of  the  general 
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interest problem.  Thus we  can investigate mith certainty 
into the nature und  origin of  the phenomena  of  interest 
without requiring to decide  beforehand  on  the  emct  bound- 
ary 2ine  between the two projh"  *  (p. 10.t) 
Now, it seeuis to me that the industrial function of  the 
undertaker, the  consideration of  which is thus unceremo- 
niously brushed aside, must first be understood before  the 
problem of  interest  can  be  attacked at all.  Everybody 
recognizes  that  undertalcers  are the  chief  borrowen of 
wealth, und that their demand for money is the ruling cir- 
cumstance in the loan market.  It would seem, therefore, 
that the nature  of  the demand  they exert would  have a 
good den1 to do with )hat is paid for the use  of  capital. 
But it is not perhaps so well recognized that undertnkers 
are  renlly the  only borrowers of  wealth.  Spendthrifts, 
indeed, borrow  to  support  expenses  in  excess  of  their 
incomea.  But such loans are made by them to avoid the 
depletion of  capitd funds of  thoir own, und may be  loolced 
upon,  therefore,  as  being  borrowed  for  productive  pur- 
poses.  What  the  spendthrift  really wastes  is  his owii 
capital, or the capital he is supposed to have, und  not the 
capital of  the one who lends to him. 
Great divergente of  view exists, indeed, as to what the 
iridustrial functions of  the undertalcer are.  But, unless it 
can be shown that the employment of  capital in produc- 
tion is not among them, it would surely seem  the natural 
Course  to pursue, in attaclcing the problem of  interest, to 
find out why the undertalcer is willing to pay interest 0x1 
the capital intrusted to him, und why, also, he cannot ob- 
tain capital dthout paying  interest.  NON, the first of 
theae questions cannot he aiismered at  arid the Se~ond 
only partially, unless me  study industrial phonomena from 
the pndertalcer's  Point  of  view.  And we  Cannot 
this point of viem until we  have fully annlyzed the nature 
*Tl10 Itdics nm mine. 
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of  the income which serves as the inducement to his in- 
dustrial activity.  But this  essential  Irnolyledge  is  just 
what Professor Böhm-Bawerlr refuses to avail himself  of, 
for which, to be sure, there is thii excuse to be pleaded: 
that, of  all the  four forms of  income, profit  is the least 
understood.  And  it  must  be frankly acknowledged  in 
addition that the idea of  profit held by Professor Böhm- 
Bawerlc is also that of  a great many other economists. 
Although the  of  profit is ostensibly eliminated 
from Kapital und Eapitalzins,  enough is said  to make it 
evident  that  profit  is there.looked  upon  as  simply the 
wages  of  management,*  and  the undertaker as no  more 
than  the  manager  of  the  industry.  The fact that  he 
enjoys the sole control of  the capital engaged is regarded 
as  a mere incident of  the personal  efforts he  expends in 
conducting  the  business.  This view  of  the  undertaker 
necessitates classing him among laborers;  and it is natural 
for one  holding  it to assume  that the undertalcer's  rela- 
tion  to the problem  of  interest does not  differ radicully 
from that of  other individuals of  the Same  general  class. 
But, while this attitude towards the undertaker  prob- 
ably explains the omission to resolve profit, as a necessary 
preliminary  to the resolution  of  the interest problem,  it 
does not rcally excuse it; for the fact remaius that, be he 
merely a higher kind of  laborer or be  he more than that, 
it is the undertaker alone who pays interest and uses capi- 
tal.  Aud, this being so, how can  interest and capital be 
understood, when he and his  motives  are ignored? 
Professor Böhm-Bawerk is perfectly correot  in his as- 
sumption that the wages of  management, although earned 
by  intellectual  rather  than  physical  exertion,  are  yet 
mages.  It is also very rarely the case that the undertalcer 
fails to eain such wages by exercising  some personal con- 
trol over bis enterprise.  But, on the other hand, we  per- 
"  &ny  who Iiold aimilar vio~vva spanlc of  insi~rnnco  also ns n oonstitnont of 
proflt; bot P~fossor  Bähm-Bawork oormotly omits it an tlio  ~round  thnt 
lnsWnO8 is nn  olomont of  cost, and not of  gnin. 
haps as seldom come  across an undertaker who does not 
delegate  a prtrt  of  his  duties  of  management to agents 
paid by a  salary.  And if  the peculiar form of  income, 
usually spoken  of  as profit, is really only wages  of  man- 
agement, it is difficult to see why  we  may  not  proper17 
speak of  the salaries paid  such agents as profit.  Yet  no 
one regards them in that light. 
The undertuker is often a landlord, and nearly always a 
capitnlist; and a part of  the income he  enjoys, as a  con- 
crete individual, is usually due to rent and interest.  And, 
7  if  the  rest  of  his  income  is composed  of  the vages of 
management, there is no problem of  profit at all.  Accord- 
ing to this view of  profit, it  is a composite income;  and the 
solving of  ita  problem, if  problem it can be  culled, con- 
sista simply in resolving it into its component park,-of 
rent, interest, and wages. 
But, if  science is  to justify  the popular conception of 
profit  as fundamentally distinct from  other kinds  of  in- 
come, it must do so  by pointing  to something the under- 
talrer  does for pay whioh is rcwarded by  neither  wages 
nor interest, nor reut,-something  which Professor Böhm- 
I  Bawerlc has entirely overloolted.  NON,  just  such a pecul- 
iar industrial function of  the undertalrer  is  found in his 
being the Person ~vhb  relieves others oof rislr.  He it is wlio 
bargains  with  the  laborer  for  the  use  of  his  personal 
I,'  efforts, with thc landlord for the use  of  bis land, arid with 
the  capitalist  for  the  use  of  his  wealth.  T0  all  these 
classes of  economio persons he  malres  over, or engages to 
make over, a definite sum of  value or power  $0  purchase, 
and talres the chance of  recouping himself out of  the Pro- 
ceeds of  the product when  sold.  In doing these things, 
he evidently renders to  each  claas  a  Service  similar  to 
7  that rendered by an assuiance oompany when  it insures 
us  against  deatll,  accident,  or  los8  of  propert~. W~Y 
should the undertaker do this?  What is his inducement? 
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[including wages of  management, which  Professor Böhm- 
Bawerk considers profits],  aud the other half  per  cent.  is 
for our profit!'  Now, this last half Per cent. is pure profit, 
-  profit, that is, in the sense in which the term should be 
exclusively employed in economics; namely, to denote th~ 
peculiar form of  income which differs radicaliy from wages, 
interest, or rent.  Profit, the special reward  of  the  under- 
taker, is, then, the income that arises from the chance  of 
gain being  greater  than  the  chance  of  loss  in risks as- 
sumed. 
Now, why is it that, while the insured would pay three 
or  four  per  cent.  rather  than run the risk hiiself,  the 
insurer  will  relieve  hirn of  the risk  for  one  aud a h:rlf 
per cent., plus expenses?  1s it because insurers are less 
nervous  about risk than the insured?  Not at  all; for it 
wiU be  found that these same insurers, if  they have any 
buildiigs of  their own, will  insure  them in  other  com- 
panies,  and,  liie their customers,  would pay  a premium 
of  three  or' four  per  cent.  if  it  were  necessary.  The 
reason  is  found  in  thä  well-understood  mathematical 
principle that a number of  separate rishs  assumed by the 
same  Person  tend  to  neutralize  each  other.  On  this 
account aome very rich people adopt tho policy of  not in- 
suring at .,  and others not quite rich enough  to take all 
the chancea  insure  for  only  part  value.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that insuraiice  companies are  so  careful  to keep 
their risks well distributed.  And the principle affords an 
explauation also of  the prefererice insurers always give to 
wealthy companies doing an extensive business. 
Now, the undertaker  does for  businees  in  general just 
what insurance  companies do for a special riak, only the 
process  is reversed.  The insurance  companies  accept a 
definite sum for the  assumption of  risk, while  the under- 
taker pays a definite sum for a product the value of  which 
is uncertain.  But the principle is the same, as the inaurer 
charges more  than  the  risk  is worth,  while  the under- 
taker pays  less than the product  will  probably sell for. 
130th relieve  others of  risks  for  a  consideration whiCh 
others are glad to give.  Both, therefore, render  a  Service 
worth more to its recipients than  the price  they have  to 
pay, and yet worth less to themselves than they receive 
for it.  It  is,  to  pnraphrase  Professor  Böhm-Bawerk,  a 
mutually advantageous  exchange of  <<certain  goods"  for 
"uncertain  goods." 
But  certain  goods " are almays LLpresent  goods,"  and 
''  uucertain gooda "  are always <<future  gcods."  There is 
an element of  time in the one Oase  as in the other.  And 
if this element of  time resolves the problem  of  interest, 
which is the objective point  of  Professor Böhm-Bawerk's 
treatise, it resolves the problem  of  the undertaker's profit 
also.  But it surely seems  absurd  to suppose that  two 
I  such  utterly  dissimilar  things  as interest aud profit  are 
both fully explained by a single circumstance; and yet, as 
we  shall see  later,  the <<surplus  value"  which  Professor 
Böhm-Bawerk  defines  and  treats as  interest  is  a  com- 
posite sum of  interest proper und profit proper, and by no 
means  homogeneous, as he assumes it  to be.  It is  true 
enough, aa  Professor Böhm-Bawerk olaims, thirt the pur- 
chasing power  of  present goods  equals the  present PUP 
chasing power  of  future goods.  This entitles ua, indeed, 
to claim for the omer  and for the rislrer  of  capital  that 
,.  they are entitled to divide betjveen themaelves the Tier- 
ence  between  tlie present and the future value of future 
goods;  but I wholly fail to see hom the "principle of  dis- 
Count "  solves either the problem  of  interest or the prob- 
lem  of  profit.  The question immediately  arises,  Why 
should the lapse of  time  afford in the one case iuterest to 
the capitalist and in the other  profit to the  undertalrer? 
Wlien  this  question is asked about interest, are  not 
obliged  to seek the answer in some theory of  capital sim- 
ilar, at  least, to the productive, use, and abstinente theories 
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bound to found our theory of  profit  upon  tbe phei~omena 
attendant upon risk ? 
The best  test perhaps  of  the  adequacy of  time to ex- 
plaiu either interest or profit  is to be  found in the expla- 
nation it affords UE of the variations in their rates.  Other 
things  remaining  unchanged,  the  rates  both  of  interest 
and profit  do vary with  the  necessary lapse  of  time  be- 
tween the production  of  anything und its sale; but there 
are  variations in both  these rates which are far more im- 
portant, in  a scientiflc sense, than those due alone to time. 
Does the element of  time explain why a banlc in the West- 
ern und  Southern States will be able to lend at eight or 
ten per  cent., while  the  Bank of  England is lending, on 
no better security, at  two or three per  cent.?  Or does it 
explain why the average of  net profit is higher in a risky 
than in a safe business?  Surely, the problems of  interest 
und profit are not solved uutil such variations as these are 
explicable. 
If the English reader will examine carefully the distinc- 
tion di.awn  between <'gross inkrest " und "net  interest " 
in  Kapital wnd iiapitalezizs, he will notice that the use of 
the term "gross interest "  is one he  is wholly unaccustomed 
to.  NO cdiicated  American  or Englishman mould speak 
of  the rent, or  hire, of  a  house, or of  the gross gains of  a 
business as interest.  But allowing the term, und merely 
noting, as We  pass  along, that it could hardly have beeu 
selected by any one  holding  precise views  of  the nature 
of  interest, we find  Professor  Böhm-Bawerk defining net 
interest in two ways :  first, as "what  can  be  obtained by 
a perfectly safe loan of  capital";  aud, secondly, as  what 
is usually paid for the loan  of  capital to be employed by 
uudertakers."  Throughout  his  book  he  treats these two 
conceptions  of  interest  as  identical.  That  they  really 
d"er  very radically is perhaps  made  sufficiently evident 
by placing his  two  defuiitiona in juxtaposition;  but the 
diatiuction  is so important to any anaiysis of  Professor 
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Böhm-Bawerk's theories that it may be weil to enforce it 
by an  illustration.  A  mealthy  man  who  hau  funds  to 
spare finds that by buying government bonds he can get 
26  per  cent. on his  investmeut.  So  doing,  he loans  his 
money on the best security there is.  But he cun alao lend 
his  money by  buying good business Paper,  und  he  pro- 
ceeds to calculate which  he  had better  do.  He says to 
himself:  "If  I buy paper, I sball have to give a  certnin 
UmOunt of attention to credits; und part of  the time, while 
looking around for  paper that suits me, my funds will lie 
idle in the bauk.  About & per cent. will make up for this 
probable  108s  of  interest  und  pay me  for  my personal 
efforts.  Besides this, there is some risk  in trusting indi- 
vidual~;  und my money may lie idle longer thau I antici- 
pitte.  These  risks, as nearly as I can  calculate, are  not 
over 1  per cent. per  annum for the class of  paper I pro- 
pose to buy.  This makes 4 per  cent. whioh I must get 
to pay me  for  the use of  my capital, und for my persond 
efforts, and as insurance."  NON,  will this man buy paper 
at 4 per cent.?  He aurely will not do so  if  he is a good 
business man.  He will  demand some compensation, be- 
aides the inere insurance, for the rislr he is to run. 
It is customary for undertakers to obarge up to inter- 
est account uil  that  they  nctudy pay  for  the  use  of 
money.  Consequently, the word  4Linterest''  is  used  in 
popular  parlance  to Cover  all sums so paid over.  But, 
looked at from the scientiec point  of  view, this So-called 
oontraot interest is Seen  to be  made  up  of  three  ~~tiußt 
park.  Regarded  as  compensation  to  the  lender, it  in- 
oludes, besides pure interest, a reward for the rislring of 
his capital  a reward for personal effort in investigat- 
ing credits und plaoing loans.  The hal  analysis of  what 
is  usudy called  interest,  und  what  Professor  Böhm- 
Bawerk  treats  as  pure intereat, sh0~8  it to be  really  a 
composite iucome, made  up  of  pure interest, Pure profit, 
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nomic  problem  of  interest in the vulgar  meaning of  the 
term ccinterest,"  it is manifest that it  is not the economic 
problem  of  pure  interest,  as  Professor  Böhm-Bawerk 
assumes it to be.  It is not a simple problem, the solution 
of  which  can  be  based  upon  a  single phenomenon,  the 
lapse of  time, but a  compound problem,  the  solution  of 
which must be  found in three radically distinct classes of 
phenomena,-those,  namely,  which  determine  the  safe 
employment  of  capitul,  those  which  govern  the  risks 
attendant upon the security offered, und those which influ- 
ence certuin kiids of  personal exertions. 
There is, perhaps, no  principle  governing economic in- 
vestigations more imperative  than the rule that the classi- 
ficaticns and distinctions  of  the  science,  to be  fruitfnl, 
muat be founded on funotion.  The moment we begin to 
seleat concrete  iudividuals  or concrete phenomena,  and 
class them  into  groups,  we  are lost.  Not an individual 
can be found who does not engage in more than one way 
in  production.  Even  the propertyless laborer  has  one 
element of  risk in his environment,-he  can never be Sure 
of  steady  employment.  The possessor of  wealth  cannot 
wholly  avoid  risking  it,  and  must  give  some  personal 
attention  to  his affairs.  The  owner  of  land takes  the 
chance of  its value  changing.  And the undertaker never 
confroes  himself  to  running  rislcs  the  management  of 
which  is wholly given over  to others, and it is but very 
rarely the case  that all  the  capital  engaged in his enter- 
prise is borrowed.  It would be porhaps impossible to find 
anywhere a  single individual whose  income is absolutely 
homogeneous.  If  concrete individuals must  be  classed 
for the purposes of  science, euch one must form a class by 
himself  if ow  classes  are  to be  clearly demarcated.  It is 
here that the ultra Historical School meet with an insu- 
perable difficulty in the application of their method.  But, 
al*hough he is himself an opponent of the ultra Historical 
Method, do~s  not Professor  Döhm-Bawerk really adopt it 
in ita most uiiwicldy form when he classes profita und  in- 
terest  together  as  constituting the income from  capital, 
merely because one individual is so frequently bhe  recipi- 
ent of  both form of  remuueration ? 
Professor Böhm-Bawerk's conception of  capital can also, 
I thi~ik,  be shown to be erroneous, especiully in his defini- 
tion  of  National  Capital.  An  error here  has,  of  Course, 
considerable iduence on the successful determination of 
the problem of  interest;  but, us  the correotion of  the error 
is  not absolutely essential to the line of  my argument, I 
will merely enter a caveat. 
Having  examined  the premises upon  which Professor 
Böbm-Bawerk founds both hii own theoly of  iiiterest und 
the criticisms which  he passes upon  the  theories  of  pre- 
vious investigators, it remsjns to point out how the mis- 
conceptions to whiich  I bave ventured to call attenticn 
affect these criticisms und bis own conclusions.  TO  prop 
erly appreciate his  work  iii these  particnlars, some fur- 
ther consideration  is needed of  what is involved in the 
industrial  function  of  the undertaker. 
The undertaker (or,  as he would be better named, the 
enterpriser, as the word  enterprise "  connotes nsk, which 
the ward  L'  undertake"  does  not)  is primarily, aS  We  have 
seen, the Person who relieves others of  rislc for a oonsidere 
tion always in exoess of  the chanoe of  10~s  ~upposed  to be 
incurred.  We have now to notice what attendant circum- 
stances Ure  necessarily connect'ed with the exercise of tu 
fundamental, or distinguiahing, function of the undertaker; 
und the result will be, I trust, to considerably enhance hi5 
importance in our eyes. 
In the first place, he owns the earth und nearly every- 
thing on it.  That is, he  hns  possession  of  all concreta 
objects possessed of  the power to purchase, incluang land 
as weii as  all  c&pital goods,"  und  excluding 0nly such 
weulth as has come into the hands of  the final Oonsumer. 
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longer held for sale have not lost their power to purchase, 
and so  ceased to be mealth in the strict meaning of  the 
term. 
Not only must the possession of  the means of  produc- 
tion, so  far as they are capable of  being owned at all, be 
mith the undertulter, but the product of  industry remnins 
his,  and  his  only, from  its  inception  to its  final  sale. 
It never belonged to any one else.  The laborer,-Marx 
to the contrary,  notwithstunding,-the  landlord,  or  the 
capitalist, never  had  any sort of  claim to it.  And the 
reason  is that  the  risk  of  what the product  will bring 
in  exchange is inseparable from  its control.  When the 
product is passed from hand to hand, the fuuctibn  of  the 
undertaker  passes  along  with  it,  und  immediately  de- 
volves  upon  the new possessor,  unless he abrogates his 
industrial privilege  by consuming, or determining to con- 
sume, the product that he has acquired.  Industrial enter- 
prise, as the function of  the undertaker or enterpriser is 
best  named,  is the twin sister  of  labor, both being born 
on the occasioi~  when things were first produced for the 
purpose of  being exchnnged. 
The undertalrer an  such has, to be  sure, nothing to do 
with the creation of  the other three industrial forces.  He 
neither appropriates land nor  saves capital, nor begets In- 
borers.  But land as soon as appropriated, capital as soon 
as  accumulated,  and  human  beings  as soon  as they are 
ready to labor productively, pass under his control.  The 
only person who escapes him is the consumer, who is indeed 
bis master;  for he  has to cater to bis tastes.  Evidently, the 
undertaker is a person  of  enough industrial  importance 
for  an economist to be  on speaking terms with him. 
If now we put ourselves in the shoes of  the undertaker, 
or enterpriser, Te  shall find a certain  amount of  truth in 
euch of  the tbree classes of  theories about interest which 
Professor Böhm-Bawerk  condemns and rejects, und  that, 
+alten together, they  do  afford a full expla~iation  of  the 
phenomena of  interost. 
In the first plnce, as to the prodiictive explanations of 
interest, there  is a sense in which  capital is productive 
and there is a sense in mhich it is not.  But in this latter 
sense the enterpriser is alone entitled to be  cailed n pro- 
ducer.  To illustrate:  a farmer might  sny  witii  perfect 
propriety that  he  raised  a  thousand  biishels  of  mheat 
last year;  while the truth might be thnt he was  a gentle- 
man farmer, who had not been within a hundred miles of 
his farm during the time the mheat was grown.  Speaking 
of  this Same ~vheat,  the farm hands whoni  our gentleman 
farmer  employed  might  sny,  <<Te  raised  a  tliousand 
bushels of  wheat lnst year ";  but it is evident they would 
sped in a very different sense.  In wbat does  this dier- 
ence in the meaning of  the terni consist?  Economically 
spealcing, no  doubt, tlie hired laborer is  exactly on a par 
with  such landlords and capitalists as the man, who em- 
ploys the productive powers  of  all tluee, lins  occasion  to 
harguin with.  If we are regarding prodiiction from + social 
point of view,-tliat  is, as the cominunity as a whole. has to 
do with it,-there  is a sense in wliich land, labor, cnpital, 
und  enterprise  oun  be  considered  as  producing  jointly. 
Biit, when we  adopt the inclividualistic or class point of 
viem, undertakers nre alone eiititled to be regarded as pro- 
duce1.s.  And  this latter alone is the scientifio point  of 
view, because tlie motiyes to productive activity are indi- 
vidualistic rather than social.  Landlords, capitalists, und 
Iaborers do nothing  but furnish the means  by which the 
enterprisers produce.  Capital, therefore, is productive in 
exactly the Same sense that land und  labor we; alid Pro- 
fessor Böhm-Bawei.k would  seem  to  hnve  110  groilnd for 
contrasting labor with  oapital' in  the way  lle does.  In- 
deed, aily one who will  carefully go  over  his  criticisln of 
tlie  productive tlieories of  interest cuiinot, I thillk, fail to 
notice  that  this  siipposed  difference  is  si~ply  assumed 
withoUt any attempt to prove it, aild that wlint  proof is 
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interest at all which  is really  a surplus value.  But the 
moment we supply this hiatus in the argument it becomes 
evident that the undertaker pays  interest  for  exactly the 
Same reason that Iie pays rent und vages, because, that is, 
of the ability of  cttpital to serve as a means  of  production. 
In this connection it rnay be  well  to  notice  another 
confusion of  thought that interferes with Professor Böhm- 
Bawerk's  exposition of  interest.  He lays great stress on 
distinguishing hetweeu the production of  utilities and the 
production  of  value, even to  the point  of  affirming that 
value is created not by the producer, but by the valuer,- 
the consumer.  Perhaps the  best  way  of  indicnting  the 
relation here between utility and value would be to say 
that, while special values  are relative, aggregate value is 
positive.  Let us suppose a community of  three claases of 
producers,-one  raising wheat,  one manufacturing cloth, 
und one rendering personal services.  Now, so long as the 
Same amounts of  wheat und of  cloth are produced, an.d  the 
Same aggregutes of  services are rendered, it is evident that 
the total power to purchase  is the same, no  matter how 
the power  of  either product to purohase  the  othera may 
vary.  But let us suppose that, through  some invention, 
the producers of  cloth are enabled to double their produot. 
Here is evidently an additional creation of  utility, und, if 
we  look  further, Te also  find that  tlie  power  of  wh'eat 
and services to  purcbase  010th has  heen  doubled.  The 
increased  production  of  cloth  involved  n fresh  creation 
of  value just  as truly as it involved  n fresh creation  of 
utility.  And, furthermore,  the new value has gone, just 
where the new utility weilt, to the producers of wheat and 
services, who now get twice as much 010th as before, while 
the makers of the cloth get no more wheat und services. 
But it  by no means always happens  that the creator of 
additional produot is able to retain for himself none of  the 
power  to purchase  which came into being with it.  XE  is 
only as the selling price of  goods is cheapened  that this 
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benefit is transferred  to others.  The important tbing to 
notice  is that the additional power  to purchase retained 
by the producers is a part, or the whole, as the oase rnay 
be,  of  the additional power  to purchase  involved ,in the 
increase of  their product.  In other words, the capitaliat 
receives,  in his  interest,  a  part  of  the  additional value 
due  to  the  employment  of  the  capital he  has  contrib- 
uted.  Why, tben, may  we  not attribute interest to  the 
productivity of  the capital?  That is not, to be  Sure, to 
fully explain interest.  But is it not one  of  the elements 
of  any consistent  explanntion, and  perfectly  valid  aud 
scientific, so far as it goes?  Why, indeed, will the  under- 
taker pay interest to the capitalist?  1s it becnuse  he  can 
produce a greater amonnt of  useful things by the aid  of 
the borrowed capital?  Not at  alI; for it makes no dBer- 
ence  to  the undertnlser how  much  utility  his  products 
possess.  All he caree for is what  they will sell for,-  the 
amount, that is, of  value, or power to purchase, they will he 
endued with.  What ia  it for man to create?  He cannot 
increaae  matter:  all he can do is to change its form.  Buh 
change of  form  changes attributes.  To  create is,  there- 
fore, to endow things 6th  new attributes.  But not only 
is value an attribute of  the things put into new forms  hy 
undertalcerii, but it is the only attribute the undertaker  is 
solicitous 4bout.  He rnay not, indeed, be Sure  hom  much 
he can retain of  the power  to purchase he may be  creab 
ing; but can we, for that reason, deny that he  creates it? 
Beauty is  a  relation  of  the  concrete to tlie  mind  of  its 
percipient, just  as value  is to  the  mind of  the  valuer; 
but we rightly regard the artist rather than the per~i~ient 
as  tlie  oreator  of  beauty.  Why,  then,  flhould we  1001~ 
upon the valuer, rather than the producer,  the  oreator 
of  value 7 
How  Professor  Böhiu-Bawerlr  confuses i~terest  and 
profit is curiously shown in his critioism of  J.-&  S~Y,  the 
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had not, indeed,  a very  precise  conception of  the iiidus- 
trial function of  the undertaker, and apparently no con- 
ception  at  all  of  the  nature  of  his  income.  But his 
conception of  the undertaker's relation to the problem of 
interest, though inadequate,  is far in ndvance of  that of 
his  critio.  Say considers, to quote from  Professor Böhm- 
Bawerk liimself, that there ure three productive factors, or 
funds,-G'  nature, capitul, und human labor " (p.  121),- 
and that "the functiou of  distributing is performed by the 
undertaker, who buys the services necessary to the produc- 
tion, und pays for them according to the state of  the mar- 
ltet.  In  this may the productive Services receive a value." 
(P.  122.) 
In  other  words,  cnpital  is  productive  for  the  Same 
reason that land und labor are;  namely, that the undeik 
taker pays for its use as a factor in, or ineans  of, produo- 
tion.  But  this  is to say that interest is not a  surplus 
value.  How does Professor  Böhm-Bawerlr  criticise  this 
exposition of  the matter?  He immediately assumes that 
Say regarded  interest as a surplus value, the  very thiig 
that Say denied.  He says  (p.  128),  When  capital has 
CO-operated  in the making  of  a  product,  why  does that 
product  normnlly possess  so much  value that after  the 
other 00-operating productive  services, lahor  und  use  of 
land, are'paid for at  the market  price  [what  Say claims 
is  that the use  of  capital also is paid for at its market 
price],  there remaina over  enough value  to  pay  for  the 
services  of  cnpita1,-enough,  indeed, to  pay  these  ser- 
vices in direct proportion  to tAe  amownt  and  tlle duration 
of  the  employment  of  capital?""  Now, where wages and 
rent  are  subtracted,  is  this dejhite  and  predetermined 
amozint due to  capital, for its use in  production,  all that 
remains over?  Does not the remainder  contain, basides 
this, an indefinite and  iindetermined amount  due to the 
undertaker  for  the rislr.  he  has  assumed?  And if  this 
"Th0  Itnlioa am mino. 
question  be  anawered  in the  negative, which it  surely 
cannot be, how can a suui of  interest  predetermined, <'in 
direct proportion to the amount und  the duration of  the 
employment  of  capital,"  be  loolred  upon  as  a  surplus 
value?  The very meaning of  this latter term is a sum of 
value which  is the residuum left  after  nl1 predetermined 
Sums are subtracted."  To  put it concisely,  Say affirms 
that interest is not a residuiim, or swplus value.  Very 
weil,  replies Professor  BÖhm-Bawerk;  but the point  is, 
auppoaing you to he  correct, liow are  we  to  explain in- 
terest as heing  a residuum,  or  surplus value? 
Succinctly stated,  Professor  Böhm-BawerYs criticism 
of  the '<use theories  of  interest"  consiats in the  denial 
that capital has any use beyond tlie utilities of  the "capital 
goods"  of which it  is  composed, nnd that, as theae utilities 
ure  all included in the value  of  the product  before it is 
enhanced  by  the  capihlist's  shure, it  cannot he  for the 
utilities  contaiued  in the capital  goods  that interest is 
paid.  But who puys this interest?  1s it not  the under- 
taker?  By making  this payment does he not obtain the 
opportunity of  risking the capital he  has  borrowed?  1s 
not this opportunity to malre a profit, which is afforded by 
tlie control of  capihl, of  iise or utility to the undertalcer? 
and ia  it not a  use  or utility whioh  is not to he  found 
among the material uses of  the capital goods themselves  ? 
The sole material uses of the <'capital  good"  bread are to 
appease  hunger  und  sustain  life;  but  does  the  hotel- 
keeper  buy bread for any such purpose, or because he Can 
aupply it to his guests at a profit? 
It miglit,  indeed,  be  thouglitlessly objeoted that land 
und labor are as  essential as  cnpital to the  seouring of  8 
profit  by the undertaker; und, if  he paYs  for  use  of 
capihl, ~hy  does he not pay somethiug in excess of  rent 
und  inter&  to his  landlord  und  to  bis  laborers?  The 
*  ~hb  ja  obowhem ao~on>lodged  by Profeesor Bbhm-Bawerk, vhen ho 
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reply is, of  Course, that there are  no  pre-existent  utilities 
which  the undertaker buys when he  pays  for  land and 
labor, and which  reappear  in the value  of  the produot; 
and the Same tbing is true of  fixed  capital.  The cost of 
the product to the undertaker is made up of  four ingredi- 
ents; namely, the value  of  the pre-existing utilities (i.e., 
the material uses  of  the  capital goods themselves)  con- 
tained in the ciroulating  cnpital  employed, and the value 
of  the utilities  freshly  crented by the use of  the whole 
capital, of  the land, and of  the labor  employed.  In  other 
words, the cost to the maker  of  auything is what he pays 
for pre-existent utilities and for the use of  land, the use of 
labor, and the use of  capital.  Cupital, then, stands in this 
respect  exactly  on  a  par with the other  two  "means  of 
production." 
It may indeed  be claimed by Professor  Böhm-Bawerk 
that the opportiinity of  securing  a profit  afforded  by the 
control  of  capital  is  among  the  "material  services,"  or 
Nutzleistmgen, or  use  renderings,"  On  account of  which 
'<  capital goods "  are valuable.  But, even if this be graiited, 
this particular  Nutzleishng differs from any other in the 
very circumstance which will  decide the case against him. 
Now, I do not thinlc that the control over capital goods 
necessary for  the realization  of  profit  is meant  by  Pro- 
fessor Böhm-Bawerk to be included in his Nwtzleistungelt; 
but, if  it  ia  to be so iucluded, then there is a material use 
of  oapital goods whioh  the purchaser, who pays  cash  for 
them, does not  want, und does not obtain, and does not 
pay for, and which the undertaker, when he borrow, does 
want, and does  obtain, and doe8 pay for.  And it is to be 
further remarked that it  is a iise which the capitalist does 
not part with to a cash customer.  By a mere exohange of 
one lot of  capital goods for another lot of  equal value the 
capitnlist retains his  privilege  of  using his capital ns an 
undertalcer.  It is only ~vhen  110 sells ''  present goods "  for 
"future  goods"  that this use of  his wealth  escapes Iiim, 
arid it is then only he charges interest. 
The productive theory and the use theory do  not, in- 
deed, either simply or together, fully solve the problem of 
interest.  That problem  hns  two  purts.  Before it is mas- 
tered  two  questions  have  to be  answered, mhy  interest 
is paid  und why interest is  exaoted.  We  have  to  con- 
sider the Special instance of  exchange from the point of 
view of each of  the exohangers,  These two theories do, it 
seems  to  me  furnish  a satisfactory answer  to  the first 
question; but they afford no  direct reply to  the  second. 
The powers of  nature are useful to the undertaker, but he 
does not always have to pay for them.  The problem of 
wages is not settled until me luiow why laborers are able 
to exact wages for their efforts, nor the problem  of  rent 
untii we know mhy landlords are sucoessful in demanding 
payment for  the use  of  tbeir  land.  Liewise an impor- 
tant part of  the problem of  interest is the finding out how 
it Comes to pass that capitalists are able to obtain interest 
on their capital. 
Now, I contend, in opposition, I fear, to many  econo- 
mists, that tlie cost of labor, in the econoinic  sense of  the 
term, has nothing to do with labor's being an effort.  Thia 
is manifastly true of  rent.  Letting his land involves no 
pain or sacrifice to the landlord further  than  the sacrifice 
of  what he  could have  obtained by farming hia land him- 
self.  Laboriug for another does often involve some such 
pain  or sacri6ce  of  ease.  But suppose labor WS  always 
enjoyable,  wouid  mages  cease?  By  no  meaus.  Their 
aggregate  would be  fully as pest as at present, though 
their distribution might be  different.  Wage8 are exacted 
because laborers  can work for themselves if  there  i~  no 
sufficient inducement  to work  for 0th~~.  The tost  of 
labor to the laborer is not his t03, but what bis tot1 would 
bring him  if he worlred for  himself.  Economic tost can 
inoliide nothing that is  not  an  economiß qumtiv.  The 
oost  of  anything  is  the purchaaing  power  sacrificed t0 
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volved.  The amount of  the capitalist's self-denial cannot, 
therefore, be spolren of  as determining the'cost of tbe use 
of  capitnl.  If  the  hardsbip  of  saving,  or  of  refraining 
fiom consuming wealth  already saved, was ten times  as 
great as it is, the rate of  interest would be no higher, pro- 
vided  as much  capital,  and so greuter  need  of  capital, 
existed.  What the hardship  of  abstinence affects is  the 
amount of  wealth that will be accumulated.  That weulth 
is capable of beiug employed as  capital is undoubtedly an 
additional motive for  abbstaining from its immediate con- 
sumption, but the reward  of  this  abstinence is the posses- 
sion of  the mealth  itself.  It does not  explain  interest, 
because no more interest can be  obtained for wealth accu- 
mulated  with  this  end  in view than when  the motive is 
simply to provide  against a  raiiiy  day.  The capitalist  is 
paid in interest for abstainiiig from or foregoing the pro- 
ductive employment of  Xis  wealth.  He mukes  over  to 
the undertaker  a privilege, or  opportunity,  for which he 
exacts  an  equivalent  in  interest.  In other words,  the 
abstinence  theory  of  interest  differs  from  the  use  and 
productive  tlieories  only  in Statement.  It is  the  Same 
theory  viewed from  the point  of  viem  of  the  capitalist 
instead of  from tlie point of view of  the undertaker.  But 
this change in the point of  view enables us to answer the 
second question involved in the problem of  interest.  It 
tells  us  why  the capitalist  is  enabled  to exact. interest, 
while  the other statements tell  us mhy  the  iindertaker 
is milling  to submit to the exactions of  the capitalist. 
It thus appears that the views of  economists concerning 
interest have  not really differed to anything lilre the ex- 
tent  which  Professor  Böhm-Bawerlc  tries  to  make  us 
believe.  Almost  any one  of  tlie critioiseli writers,  how- 
ever  carelessly und  inadequately he may  have  expressed 
himself, had a far sounder and  more  acpurate  oonception 
than his critic of  tho problem  of  interest, because, though 
some of them have spoken of  interest as profit, und others 
residuum, or surplus value, not one of  them has real]y 
considered it  as  such, as is evident by their, one and all, 
including interest as among the necessary costs of produCm 
tion.  Many of  them, in their attempts to explain inter&, 
have  addressed  themselves  to both  of  the questions in- 
volved.  They have availed themselves at one time of  the 
produotive,  or  use, theories, und  at another of  the absti- 
nence theory ;  but they were by no means inconsistent in 
this.  So far from  being  irreconcilable,  the three  state- 
ments of  the one theory  of  interest are, as me  have seen, 
really  complementary.  No  doubt  these  economists are 
guilty of  a certain vagueness und  inadequacy.  No  one of 
them has said all that could have  been  said, or has been 
altogether happy in his choice of  terms.  But this is all. 
Their sins are  mainly  those  of  omission; und,  so  fnr  as 
they are those  of  commission, the faults have  been  those 
of  careless expression ratber than errors of  conception. 
Their critic, on the  other  hand, wholly misapprehends 
the nature of the problem ho has set himself.  As we have 
seen, he goes astray in his very defiuition of  interest, mak- 
ing it include an element which cannot possibly be inter- 
est, because it is part of  the undertaker's, und not of the 
capitalist's,  remuneration.  Then,  because  this  wrongly 
included  element  of  profit  is a snrplus vulue, und  not a 
constituent of cost of  production, he naYvely  assnmes that 
interest is also a surplus value, und not  an element of COB~ 
of  production.  Armed ~vith  this  peouiiar  conception  pf 
profit  arid  interest  being  identical  (he  uses  terms 
inter~hangeabl~  throughout  his  worlr),  he  find5  it,  of 
Course, an easy matter to refute all previoua investigators 
by showing very clearly that their  theories of  interest fail 
to explain profit.  Thon  he malces a very elaborate classi- 
fication of previous theories, founded upon the Su~~osition 
that they  Ure  mutually contradictory und. exclusive, und 
wholly fails to perceive that they are really oomplemenb 
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regarded as only different ways of  stating U prinoiple com- 
mon to them 811. 
Having thiis cleared the ground so as  to bring his om 
forces up to the attack, Professor  Bähm-Bawerk offers us 
the following coiidensation of  his own theory of  interest. 
He says (p.  269) : - 
The loan is a real  exchange  of  present goods against 
future goods.  For  reasons that I shall give in detail in my 
second volume, present goods .ilLvariaOly possess a greater 
value than future goods of  the same number  and kind; 
and, therefore, a definite  sum  of  present  goods can, as a 
rule, only be purchased  by a larger snm of  future goods. 
Present goods possess an agio in future goods.  This agio 
is interest.  It is not a separate equivalent for a separate 
und durable use of  the loaned goods, for that is inconceiv- 
able :  it is a part equivulent of  the loaned  sutn, kept sep- 
arate  for  practical  Yeasons.  The  replacement  of  the 
oapital  and  the interest constitute the full equivalent!' 
(The  Italics are miue.) 
Now, to get rid of  the more technical ohjections first, 1s 
<Lthe  loan a real exchange of  present  goods against future 
goods"?  Would it not be  more acciirate  to cull it an 
exchange  of  present  goods  for  the  promise  of  future 
goods?  This, or some equivalent of  this, is the ordiiary 
method of  statement among eoonomists.  What is gained 
by the Change, except that the fact is disguised, that what 
the lender parts with is the productive use of  i+  wealth, 
which  its  actual  possession  could  liave  afforded  him? 
When it is said that tbe lender has accepted a mere claim 
in place  of  bis wealth, it is seen olearly that in  so doing 
he has made over the productive use of  it to another for a 
oertain length of  time. 
6LPresent  goode  possess an agio in future goods.  Tliis 
agio 2s  interest."  Do  prbsent  goods always. possess  this 
agio?  If so, how are the phenomena  of  insurance to be 
explained?  In  this we  have an example of  an exchange 
of  giveu nmount of  present goods for a smaller amount 
of  future goods.  On the average, those who  insure pay, 
let us say, $8  worth of  present  goods for every $2 ~02th 
of  future goode;  nud  they do it knowingly, as it is weil 
understood  that insurance  companies pay out much less 
in losses than they receive in premiums.  The agio is the 
other way.  But does it happen on that account that the 
insured lose the interest on the premiums?  By no means; 
for the money they have paid is earning interest for them 
ull the time.  If it lvas a part of  the contract of  insurance 
that this money should lie idle, they would have  to pay 
more than $3  worth of  present  goods, or premiums, for 
every $2  worth  of  future goods,  or  reimbursements for 
losses.  They get theh interest  in the  sbape  of  lower 
rates of  insurance. 
But mhen,  as  is generally the  case, the  agio is on the 
right side, is  it ulways interest alone?  A capitalist mnkes 
&wo  loans, one at  9 per cent. and  one  at  7 per  cent.  Let 
us suppose he considers the Chance  of  losiug his principal 
to be nothing in the first case, und  2 per  cent. in the sec- 
ond.  Then the agio is 8 per cent. in the first case und  6 
per cent. in the second.  Are  both ngios  simply interest ? 
If  so, what causes them  to differ?  The element of  time 
is the Same in  both, und the element of rislc has been elimi- 
nated.  But it may be replied, In your examples you have 
not eliminated the element of  the reward of  risk.  Exactly ; 
but, then, only n part of \hat  Professor Böhm-Ba~verlc  c~S 
surplus value is explainable by time. 
The Statement is, OE Course, a perfeßtly true one,-that 
L< oertain present goods '' possess an ngio  in "  equall~  Cer- 
tain future goods.'*  How does this differ, except in form, 
from the asscrtion that borrowers,  even when  the~  bave 
perfect seourity to offer, promise  t0 return  Pater sum 
than is loaned to them?  1s this phenomenon made One  bit 
clearer  by the new form  of  stiltement?  Arid  it 
equally weil understood that the transaction was  fair arid honest  one,  mutually  advantageous  to  the  transactors? 
When  the legitimacy of  interest has been  attacked,  the 
attack has always been froin  the social, and not from the 
individualistic, point of  view.  No  one has ever doubted 
that, under the rkgime  of  competition, borrowers foiind it 
to their advantage to pay interest rather than to forego 
the use of  the borrowed wealth.  And tliis is all Professor 
Böhm-Bawerk  proves  mhen  diicussing  the  exploitation 
theory of interest.  Even at this point, the one for which 
his translator claims the most credit for him, he has really 
added nothing  to what was  previously  understood  and 
sufficiently well stated. 
What a theory of  anything has to explaiu is either the 
cause or causes to which the thing to be  explained owes 
its being, or the effccts prodiiced by the thing, as varied 
by tlie environment in which it acts.  Telling  UB, though 
in somewhat novel  language, what we knew mell enough 
before, that interest is thc agio which prosent goods possoss 
in future goods, is at  the best nothing more than a diction- 
ary definitioii of  interest.  What we  really want to under- 
stand in this case is why this agio existlr.  Why will  men 
pay more  than  they receive if  only  they  are allolved to 
defer payment for a while?  Stating that they will do so 
does not explain their aotion.  The reason why they do so 
is what must constitute the theory of  interest.  It is, here 
and there in Professor  Böhm-Bawerk's treatise, somewhat 
darkly hinted that tbis explanation  is to be  found in the 
element of  time.  But time is an element of  the problem, 
not of  its explanation.  The very question asked is why 
something will be puid for the privilege  of  deferring pay- 
ment.  This  is  the  question,  aud  the  only  qucstion,  a 
theory  of  interest  has  to  answer.  How does Professor 
Böhm-Bawerk answer it?  He says (the Italics are mine), 
"  FOT  reasona  that Ishall gbe in detail  in  my second  vol- 
me."  When stated, these reasbns turn out to be nothing 
buh  a  combination  of  the  use,  tlie productive,  and  the 
abstinence theories. 
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This  is  indeed  admitted,  with  charming  naSvetvetS  and 
unconsciousness, in  the  translator's  preface, where it is 
said:  LcNot  that any one can get the monopoly  of  time, 
and not that time itself has any m'agiio  power of producing 
value  [what  is this  but  an  admission  that  time is not 
the cause  of  interest?],  but that the preference by the 
capitalist  of  a future good to a present  one  enables  the 
worlcer to realize hia  labor  in  undertakings that  aave  labor 
and  inweaae  wealth."  [What is this but OUT.  old reliable 
friends, the use and productive theories ?I  The reward for 
working falls to the worker, manual and intellectual ;  the 
reward for  waitin,q,  60  the  capitalist ody."  [What  is 
waiting but abstinence?] 
At the end of  his labors oiir author is Eound  standing 
on  the very  ground he  hes  so  very carefuUy  dug away 
from  under  the feet of  others.  And,  Strange to say, it 
is just  here that he first finds any seciire footing for him- 
self. 
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